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Abstract 
 
Over recent years, there has been increasing interest in ‘Payment by Results’ (PbR) (Pay for Success 
in the US) as a model for outcome-based commissioning services in the public sector. Such PbR 
contracts link payment to the outcomes achieved, rather than the inputs, outputs or processes of a 
service (Cabinet Office 2011). By making some or all of payment to a service contingent on delivering 
agreed outcomes, PbR supposedly reduces ‘micro-management’ on the part of the commissioner, 
encourages innovation and transfers risk away from the branch of government commissioning the 
service towards the service provider because government will only pay if outcomes are achieved. 
From government’s perspective payments for service are deferred. Given the need to reduce public 
sector spending, both the transference of risk and deferring payment for services are attractive 
propositions for government. To date, over £15 billion of services in the UK are subject to PbR 
contracts (National Audit Office 2015), in areas such as criminal justice, healthcare, and social care. 
Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds can be considered as the logical conclusion of outcome-
based performance management (OBPM) (Lowe and Wilson, 2015), as they are intended to ensure 
that financial rewards directly flow from the achievement of specified outcomes. OBPM is a general 
term used for using outcomes as a means of assessing performance (Lowe, 2013), and different 
forms of OBPM have emerged since the 1990s. OBPM is associated with New Public Management 
(NOM) (Hood 1991). This paper seeks to examine the use of Payment by Results in social care in the 
UK. Although formal evaluations of both PbR and are still limited some evaluation findings are 
starting to be published and some tentative conclusions on the potential for innovation are drawn 
from the REA. It draws on a Rapid Evidence Review of the literature on PbR is social care. 
 
Introduction 
Over the past twenty years there has a growing interest in, and development of, new and different 
payment systems for public services. These new payment systems have been developed for a 
number of reasons, and are often associated with decentralisation of decision making (Wright et al, 
2014) (Appleby et al, 2012), introducing competition and choice, of making better use of resources 
(Battye, 2015), improving public services (Battye, 2015), and realigning contract rewards to 
incentivise desired behaviours (Webster, 2016) (Fox, 2016). One such development is that of 
Payment by Results (known as Pay for Success in the United States). Payment by Results is a broad 
term that is applied to a number of wide variety of contracting arrangements (Battye, 2015). The 
common theme underlying each of these variants is that payment is made post hoc, and is 
contingent on the achievement of specified goals or targets. Payment by Results can therefore be 
contrasted with more traditional forms of public sector funding, where payment is often made ‘up 
front’ and may be based on previous service use, demand, and/or staffing levels, or what might be 
considered input-based funding.  
There are a number of differences in PbR arrangements; the level at which payments are set, 
whether the PbR payment element is the whole or part of the overall payment, and the level at 
which results are measured (Battye, 2015). One key level of variation in Payment by Results schemes 
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is that between case-based or activity based approaches (largely found in the funding of healthcare) 
(Tan et al, 2015) and outcome-based approaches. In the United Kingdom, activity-based Payment by 
Results was introduced by the early 2000s as part of reforms to hospital based healthcare, and was 
part of the then government’s attempts to introduce greater marketization in healthcare services 
(Appleby, 2012). It reimburses providers on the basis of ‘Health Resource Groups’; either condition-
related, or related to categories of procedures, interventions, or treatments (Lee et al, 2010). Similar 
reforms have been implemented in a number of different countries; the first in US healthcare, and 
subsequently in more than half of all Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries (Appleby et al, 2012). Case or activity-based Payment by Results has been the 
subject of much research, a number of evaluations, and published systematic reviews, often seeking 
to establish and quantify the impact of Payment by Results (Wright el at, 2014). There are also a 
number of studies that examine the accuracy of clinical coding and the effect this has on levels of 
payments made under PbR schemes. 
The second variant of Payment by Results, and the version that is the subject of this paper, are 
outcome-based approaches, where the outcomes are typically some measurable, desirable change 
in the condition, behaviour, or satisfaction of service users or programme participants (Finn, 2010), 
or of programmes, projects and public sector organisations. In the UK, outcome-based PbR is often 
associated with the public sector reform agenda of the Coalition Government (2010-2015) (Fox et al, 
2017), as set out in the 2011 Open Public Services White Paper, although earlier examples include 
the active labour market interventions under the New Deal programmes in the early 2000s (Battye, 
2015), and the Social Work Practices pilots in the late 2000s (Stanley et al, 2012). Outcome-based 
PbR is increasingly used across a range of UK public services, including active labour market 
programmes, children’s centres, housing related support services, probation services, social work, 
and family intervention programmes. 
To date, the evidence base around outcome-based PbR is limited (Fox et al, 2017) (Webster, 2016), 
(Battye, 2015). In contrast with the availability of evidence in relation to activity-based PbR, there 
are a limited number of evaluations published, and even fewer evaluations that focus on the impact 
of PbR on achievement of outcomes. Where articles have been published, there are often 
theoretical or critical in nature, usually with little reference to empirical evidence. The empirical 
evidence that does exist tends to be found in grey literature, often evaluations commissioned by the 
government department that has used outcome-based PbR for a specific programme or 
intervention. There are a small number of peer-reviewed articles in the field.  
This article aims to contribute to the limited empirical evidence around outcome-based Payment by 
Results. It focuses on the use of outcome based PbR in social care, an area where outcome based 
PbR is increasing being used across a wide range of different services, programmes and 
interventions. It presents findings from a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of the extant literature.   
 
Method 
A Rapid Evidence Assessment is a systematic, rigorous review of the extant literature on a specific 
subject or in a focused field. REAs aim to be explicit about search criteria used to identify relevant 
literature, and what criteria have been applied in deciding which literature to include and exclude 
from analysis. REAs can be completed in shorter timescales, and at lower cost, than systematic 
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reviews. REAs are used widely in healthcare and are increasingly being used in other areas of social 
policy, although there are some criticisms of their use in this field (Thomas et al, 2013). Broadly 
speaking, there are two forms of REA. Most published REAs focus on studies that measure and 
attribute the impact of a service, programme or intervention (I refer to these as ‘impact REAs’). 
These involve undertaking meta-analysis of the data and results provided in studies that meet the 
risk of bias and inclusion criteria. An alternative approach, and the one adopted here, using narrative 
synthesis to ‘tell the story’ (Visram et al, 2016) about how, why and in what ways a service, 
programme or intervention has been designed or implemented (what I refer to as ‘non-impact 
REAs’). Both REA forms typically involves using explicit search terms to undertake searches of a 
number of bibliographic databases, reviews of titles and/or abstracts to select relevant studies, and 
review of full articles/reports of relevant studies to determine whether they meet inclusion criteria. 
Impact REAs then involve an assessment of each included study for risk of bias, extraction of data 
and results, and meta-analysis (a statistical procedure that ‘combines’ results from multiple impact 
studies). Non-impact REAs typically have broader inclusion criteria, and will cover empirical, 
qualitative studies as well as those that focus on attributing impact.  
This REA was completed in May and June 2017 by a single researcher, the paper’s author. Typically, 
more than one researcher is involved in each stage of an REA, and mechanisms are put in place to 
enable researchers to compare, discuss and agree search terms, inclusion criteria, studies selected 
for inclusion, and findings. It is a limitation of the analysis presented here that only one researcher 
was involved throughout the process.  
Research questions 
The aim of this REA is to address the following research questions: 
1. How are outcome-based PbR contracts being used in social care in the UK? 
2. What differences or variations in their use? 
3. What challenges have commissioners and providers faced in social care services where 
outcome-based PbR contracts have been used? 
4. Is there evidence that outcome-based PbR has resulted in any greater focus on outcomes, 
any innovation in service delivery, or any improvements in value for money? 
Both because of the dearth of studies that measure and attribute impact in this area (Fox, 
2017)(Webster, 2016)(Battye, 2015), and because of the focus of the research questions on how 
outcome-based PbR is being used in social care in the UK, this research has utilised a non-impact REA 
approach. The findings presented here descriptively summarise included studies, and a narrative 
synthesis was undertaken. Narrative synthesis is an overarching term to describe a family of 
methods (Snilstveit et al, 2012) which uses words and text to summarise and explain findings from 
multiple studies (Popay et al, 2003). While there are criticisms of such approaches - the lack of 
transparency (Dixon-Woods et al, 2005) and lack of clear, explicit methods. REAs are also a method 
that is often used to increase the likely impact of research on policy and practice (Visram et al, 
2016). 
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Search methods 
Searches were undertaken on two bibliographic databases, namely Web of Science, and Social Care 
Online (hosted by the Social Care Institute for Excellence), using the search terms “Payment by 
Results” OR “Pay for Success”1. A search was also undertaken using Google, and of the websites of 
relevant UK government departments (Department of Health, Department for Education, 
Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Communities and Local Government, all of 
which are involved in aspects of social care policy). The search terms were deliberately wide so as to 
maximise the chances of identifying relevant material. Two key issues are significant here. First, 
social care is a difficult to conceptualise and define. It includes interventions aimed at helping people 
to take control of their daily life, to maintain their personal and/or accommodation cleanliness and 
comfort, to enable people to engage in social participation and involvement, protection and social 
support. One of the issues of undertaking research around social care is that it is the increasingly 
fuzzy, blurred nature of the concept, with many different names being used, and much cross-over 
between services in health, social care, housing, criminal justice, and welfare. Secondly, many papers 
do not explicit distinguish between activity and outcome based variations of PbR. The wide search 
parameters were intended to maximise the likelihood that relevant material was identified. Searches 
were limited to publications since 2008, and in English. 
The search process is summarises in figure 1 below. The searches resulted in n=151 articles being 
identified via Web of Science, and n=168 identified via Social Care Online. A further n=3 reports were 
identified through Google and searches of relevant government websites. The results of each search 
were entered onto a MS Excel spreadsheet developed for the REA. Duplicates were identified and 
removed, and a total of n=222 records remained. The title and full abstract2 of each of these n=222 
was reviewed and an initial assessment of relevance was made. Following this initial assessment, 
                                                          
1 I did not include social impact bonds in the search criteria. Although social impact bonds are often considered 
to be a type of outcome-based commissioning contract, and associated with PbR (Fox et al, 2017), there are 
some material differences in the funding mechanisms. 
2 A number of non-peer reviewed articles and reports did not include an abstract. In these cases, the executive 
summary or introduction was reviewed. 
Box 1: Search terms and inclusion criteria 
Search terms:  
“Payment by Results” OR “Pay for Success”, published in English since 2008 
Inclusion criteria: 
 Outcome-based Payment by Results – includes a focus on outcome-based PbR (whether 
the outcome-based PbR covers whole or part of funding for service, intervention or 
programme) 
 UK focused – covers services, interventions, or programmes in the UK 
 Empirical – includes details of empirical methods used (excludes literature reviews, 
policy statements, theoretical or critical pieces) 
 Social care focus – covers the design, commissioning or delivery of services, 
interventions or programmes that include some element of social care 
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n=14 studies were identified for full review. Each of these articles and reports was reviewed in full 
and was assessed against the inclusion criteria set out in box 1, and a further n=6 were excluded. The 
remaining n=8 articles were therefore included in the narrative synthesis.  
 
Figure 1: Search process 
 
Table 1 overleaf provides details of the articles and reports included for full review, identifying which 
of these articles was assessed at meeting the inclusion criteria. (Details of all n=222 articles and 
reports covered by the review, including the initial assessment, are included in appendix 1.)  
 
  
Citations identified through 
database searches
n=319
Additional citations identified 
through other sources
n=3
Records remaining after duplicates 
removed
n=222
Titles and abstracts screened
n=222
Records excluded
n=208
Full text articles assessed
n=14
Records excluded
n=6
Studies excluded from review
n=214
Studies included in review
n=8
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Author Title Year Publication/publisher Brief description Peer 
reviewed 
journal? 
Type of 
PbR 
Quality 
assessment 
Social 
care 
Meets 
inclusion 
criteria? 
Bolton, J Emerging practice 
in outcome-based 
commissioning for 
social care: 
discussion paper 
2015 Oxford Brookes 
University. Institute 
of Public Care 
Progress report exploring 
approaches taken by councils to 
Payment by Results in adult 
social care. 
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Not empirical 
- discussion 
paper 
Yes No - not 
empirical 
Compact 
Voice 
Annual survey of 
Compacts 
2016 Compact Voice Survey of issues facing local 
Compacts, how they are 
working and how national policy 
developments are having an 
impact locally. 
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
survey of 
local 
Compacts 
(n=97 
responses) 
Includes 
questions 
on Care 
Act 2015 
(social 
care) 
Yes 
Cornes, M, 
Manthorpe, 
J, Joly, L, 
O'Halloran, 
S 
Reconciling 
recovery, 
personalisation and 
Housing First: 
integrating practice 
and outcome in the 
field of multiple 
exclusion 
homelessness 
2014 Health and Social 
Care in the 
Community, 22(2), 
pp134-143 
Explores use of Housing First 
model for dealing with multiple 
exclusion homelessness 
Yes Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
qualitative 
interviews 
with n=34 
individuals 
with lived 
experience of 
homelessness 
(methods 
statement 
relates to 
wider study 
rather than 
basis of the 
paper) 
Includes 
drug 
treatment 
services 
(both 
health & 
social 
care) & 
housing 
related 
support 
No - not 
about 
PbR 
Table 1: Studies review in full, with assessment of whether study meets inclusion criteria 
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Author Title Year   Brief description Peer 
reviewed 
journal? 
Type of 
PbR 
Quality 
assessment 
Social care Meets 
inclusion 
criteria? 
Cundy, 
J 
Commissioning for 
better outcomes: 
understanding local 
authority and 
voluntary sector 
experiences of family 
services 
commissioning in 
England 
2012 Barnado's Using surveys, in-depth telephone 
interviews and an expert 
roundtable event to identify 
barriers to voluntary sector 
participation in the local authority 
commissioning process around 
family services to highlight 
examples of promising practice, 
and to recommend policy and 
practice solutions.  
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
surveys and 
interviews 
Family 
services 
includes 
education, 
housing, 
social care 
and other 
services 
Yes 
Day et 
al 
National evaluation of 
the Trouble Families 
programme - final 
synthesis report 
2016 Department for 
Communities and 
Local Government 
Process, impact and economic 
evaluation of phase 1 of the 
Trouble Families programme 
No Outcome-
based 
Empirical - 
n=20 
qualitative 
case studies 
(LAs), quasi-
experimental 
impact 
evaluation 
(secondary 
data analysis 
and 
interviews, 
treatment 
and match 
propensity 
score control 
group), 
economic 
evaluation 
Troubled 
Families is a 
type of 
family 
intervention 
programme 
that 
includes 
social care 
Yes 
Table 2 (continued): Studies review in full, with assessment of whether study meets inclusion criteria 
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Author Title Year   Brief description Peer 
reviewed 
journal? 
Type of 
PbR 
Quality 
assessment 
Social care Meets 
inclusion 
criteria? 
DCLG Supporting People 
Payment by 
Results pilots. Final 
evaluation 
2014 Department for 
Communities 
and Local 
Government 
Process evaluation of PbR pilots 
for housing related support and 
care services 
No Outcome-
based 
Empirical - 
qualitative 
(report does 
not set out 
methods 
used) 
Supporting 
People 
services 
provide low 
level, non-
statutory, 
support  
Yes 
Frontier 
Economics 
and the 
Colebrooke 
Centre 
Payment by 
Results in 
Children's Centres 
evaluation 
2014 Department for 
Education 
Report on process evaluation of 
PbR pilot in children's centres.. 
Children's centres provide and 
link to a number of services, 
some of which include social 
care provision. 
No Outcome-
based 
Empirical - 
telephone 
interviews, 
surveys, case 
study visits 
Children's 
centres 
provide or 
refer to a 
number of 
services, 
including 
social care 
Yes 
KUZNETSOVA, 
D 
Commissioning 
care in the 21st 
century: improving 
outcomes for 
people with 
learning 
disabilities 
2011 New Local 
Government 
Network 
Examines personalised services 
in social care in England, 
arguing the need for 
affordablity to accelerate 
moves towards a new form of 
outcome-based commissioning. 
The report presents an analysis 
of council cost data. 
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
interviews, 
panels, and 
case studies 
collated from 
member 
organisations. 
Secondary 
data analysis. 
Covers the 
commissioning 
of a number of 
different 
services, 
including 
statutory 
social care & 
other social 
care services 
Yes 
Table 3 (continued): Studies review in full, with assessment of whether study meets inclusion criteria 
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Author Title Year   Brief description Peer 
reviewed 
journal? 
Type of 
PbR 
Quality 
assessment 
Social 
care 
Meets 
inclusion 
criteria? 
La Valle, C Feasibility study for 
the trials of payment 
by results for 
children's centres 
2011 Centre for 
Excellence and 
Outcomes in 
Children and 
Young People's 
Services 
Describes findings from a study of 
the early development of a 
programme running from 2011 to 
2013 which seeks to trial PbR for 
children’s centres with 27 local 
authorities. 
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical Children's 
centres 
provide 
or refer 
to a 
number 
of 
services, 
including 
social 
care 
No - not 
available 
online 
Lee et al The development of 
care pathways and 
packages in mental 
health based on the 
Model of Human 
Occupation 
Screening Tool 
2011 British Journal of 
Occupational 
Therapy, 74(6), 
pp284-292 
Examines occupational needs of 
n=625 service users in relation to 
PbR in mental health services 
Yes Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
retrospective, 
descriptive 
study 
drawing on 
n=625 clinical 
records  
No - NHS 
mental 
health 
services 
No - 
activity 
based 
PbR, not 
social 
care 
Office for 
Public 
Management 
Essex multi-systemic 
therapy social 
impact bond: interim 
evaluation findings 
(year two) 
2015 Office for Public 
Management 
Captures evidence of, and 
explores the extent to which the 
Social Impact Bond (SIB) structure 
impact on the implementation of 
Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) 
and the delivery of MST through 
the SIB payment by results 
mechanism adds any further 
significant value in terms of 
outcomes or performance 
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
surveys, 
interviews, 
secondary 
data analysis 
Yes - 
about 
services 
to 
prevent 
young 
people 
going 
into local 
authority 
care 
No - not 
about 
PbR 
Table 4 (continued): Studies review in full, with assessment of whether study meets inclusion criteria  
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Author Title Year   Brief description Peer 
reviewed 
journal? 
Type of 
PbR 
Quality 
assessment 
Social 
care 
Meets 
inclusion 
criteria? 
ROBERTS, 
L and 
CAMERON. 
G 
Evaluation of the 
Essex multi-systemic 
therapy social impact 
bond: interim 
evaluation report 
2014 Office of Public 
Management 
This is the first of two interim 
reports presenting the findings 
from the first eighteen months of 
evaluation activities of Multi-
Systemic Therapy (MST).  
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
surveys, 
interviews, 
secondary 
data 
analysis 
Yes - 
about 
services 
to prevent 
young 
people 
going into 
local 
authority 
care 
No - not 
about 
PbR 
Stanley et 
al 
Turning away from 
the public sector in 
children's out-of-
home care: An English 
experiment 
2013 Children and Youth 
Services Review, 
35(1), pp33-39 
Reports on the evaluation of an 
English experiment which, for the 
first time, moved statutory social 
work support for children and 
young people in out-of-home care 
from the public to the private or 
independent sector 
Yes Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
matched 
control with 
integral 
process 
evaluation. 
Qualitative 
interviews, 
surveys and 
secondary 
data 
analysis. 
Yes Yes 
WARD, E, 
SAMPLE, E, 
ROBERTS, 
M 
Testing the waters 2010 Druglink, 25(6), 
November 2010, 
pp.11-14. 
DrugScope conducted a survey of 
its membership and other key 
stakeholders in September 2010 
to inform their response to the 
drug strategy consultation. 
No Not 
stated/not 
clear from 
abstract 
Empirical - 
membership 
survey 
(descriptive, 
qualitative) 
Drug 
treatment 
services 
including 
some 
social care  
Yes 
Table 5 (continued): Studies review in full, with assessment of whether study meets inclusion criteria  
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Findings 
Introduction 
Broadly, the studies included in this review are of two types. The first type includes a number of 
studies are evaluations of services, interventions, or programmes where PbR is being piloted (either 
in isolation, or as part of a new programme, intervention or model of working)(for example, Stanley 
et al (2013), Day et al (2016), or DCLG (2014). The second type includes studies that engage in 
research with organisations and individuals involved in planning, commissioning and delivery of 
social care, where some discussion is around the use of PbR in contracts. These studies have proved 
to be less useful in providing evidence on the use of PbR in social care in the UK. With one exception 
(Stanley et al, 2013), most studies are to be found in grey literature. A number of studies report on 
research that has been commissioned by the government department that has rolled out the 
example of PbR that is being researched or evaluated (for example, Stanley et al (2013), Day et al 
(2016), and Frontier Economics (2014)). There are no examples of European, UK research council or 
independently funded research or evaluation of outcome-based PbR in the studies included in this 
review. 
Use of PbR for pilots, trials and new programmes 
Three themes emerge in terms of the use of outcome-based PbR in social care in the UK: (1) that it is 
used and evaluated as part of the pilot, trial or roll out of a new intervention, new model of working 
or new programme;  (2) that PbR is often not used in main stream social services, long term social 
care for adults or older people, or statutory social services; and, (3) that is often used for complex 
programmes that involve multiple agencies or interventions 
Firstly, studies included in this review cover a number of new and different forms of social care, or 
ways of organising and delivering social care. In these instances, outcome-based PbR is part of a 
wider piece of innovation or change. Stanley et al (2013) for example, report on an evaluation of a 
pilot of Social Work Practices, a reform to the organisation of social work provision for children and 
families that aimed to “move services for children in out-of-home care away from local 
government…..and relocate them in the independent sector”. The pilot was introduced under the 
Labour Government of 1997 to 2010, and then “enthusiastically taken up by the Coalition 
Government (Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition, 2010 to 2015). Stanley et al identify that the 
pilot was designed in such a way that “incentives would play a role in ensuring service quality”, and 
thus would be consistent with the policy objectives often attributed to PbR. In reality, the study 
reports that PbR was a feature of just two of the six pilots covered by the evaluation. As such, the 
key change involved in the Social Work Practices pilot was the outsourcing and marketization of 
children’s services.  
Similarly, Day et al (2016) report on an evaluation of the Troubled Families programme. Phase 1 of 
this programme was introduced by the Coalition Government in April 2012, and an expanded, 
slightly amended phase 2 was subsequently rolled out in 2014/15. Troubled Families was designed 
as a family intervention programme, that targeted dedicated support focused on reducing levels of 
crime and anti-social behaviour, reducing truancy, reducing worklessness, and cutting the high costs 
of a small number of ‘troubled’ families to the public purse. The programme’s design and 
implementation was “informed by the learning from Family Intervention Projects, Total Place and 
Think Families Programme, Family Pathfinders and Community Budget Pilots.” Although badged as a 
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new programme, and allowing access to a new funding stream, Day et al report that many local 
authorities “’grew’ their Troubled Families Programme from pre-existing services and tailored their 
approach to the political landscape and service infrastructure”. 
Secondly, in where PbR has been piloted in existing services, those services might considered outside 
of mainstream, and not targeted at long term, statutory social care, or delivered by professional 
social workers. DCLG (2014) report on PbR pilots in the Supporting People programme, a programme 
that introduced in 2003 to replace multiple and complex funding arrangements for housing related 
support, low level and non-statutory services for a range of different client groups. Although an 
established programme, further changes in the funding of these services where introduced 
alongside the introduction of PbR pilots. (These changes included the removal of budget ringfencing 
arrangements and, subsequently, reductions in overall budget levels.)  
One area which was neither new nor non-mainstream/non-statutory is that of Children’s Centres. 
Children’s Centres were introduced in the early 2000s. They were put on a statutory footing under 
the 2006 Childcare Act, and provide a range of services, including: childcare, health services 
(breastfeeding, for example), employment advice, and social services. Indeed, with the exception of 
the Supporting People PbR evaluation (DCLG, 2014), all of the evaluation studies included in this 
review focus on children’s or family services. Based on the studies covered by this review, it does not 
appear that PbR is being used to fund adult social care, even for those areas of social care where 
there are complementary healthcare services (such as services for people with mental health issues) 
where activity-based PbR is being used in healthcare services in the NHS.  
Thirdly, a number of the programmes included in this study are complex; they involve a number of 
different interventions, often delivered by multiple agencies, and cross ‘traditional’ boundaries 
between areas of social policy. Children’s Centres, for example, either directly deliver or provide 
access to services in healthcare, education, and employment services, as well as social care 
interventions. The Troubled Families programme also either directly deliver or provide access to 
services in housing, healthcare, education, welfare benefits, and employment services, as well as 
social care interventions. Supporting People services are complex in terms of the range of settings in 
which such services are delivered (from sheltered accommodation for older people, through floating 
support services for people sustaining independent living, through to homeless hostels), and the 
range of different client groups covered. One study identified this as a challenge or barrier in using 
PbR. Frontier Economics (2014) found that the outcome measurement required for PbR was 
problematic for Children’s Centres because “many services are delivered in conjunction with other 
agencies; other agencies deliver similar services or services with similar objectives; children and 
families often use more than one centre…”.  
Innovation 
A key objective of introducing PbR is to incentivise innovation in how services are delivered, and 
what interventions are used (Webster, 2016). A key question for this review, therefore, was the 
extent to which PbR is associated with innovation. PbR was intended to generate innovation both by 
influencing both commissioners’ and providers’ behaviour. For commissioners, PbR was intend to 
change their focus: towards outcomes achieved by providers and away from specifying service 
delivery models and monitoring inputs and outputs, so that “the choice of method to achieve those 
objectives is transferred from the commissioner the provider” (Frontier Economics, 2014). For 
A rapid evidence review of the use of Payment by Results in social care – paper for ICPP 2017 
Author: Dr Chris O’Leary, Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, Manchester Metropolitan University 
Email:  c.oleary@mmu.ac.uk  
 
DRAFT – NOT TO BE CITED WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 
P a g e  | 13 
 
providers, the flexibility and choice of how and what interventions were delivered to meet the 
desired outcomes, coupled with financial incentives for meeting those outcomes, was intended to 
generate creativity and innovation in service delivery approaches. Encouraging innovation was a 
common theme highlight by the ten pilot areas involved in the Supporting People PbR pilots (DCLG, 
2014). The Troubled Families programme was designed in such a way that “local authorities were 
intentionally given considerable autonomy to design and deliver their local response in order that 
they would be creative in their approach” (Day et al, 2016). Similarly, the Social Work Practices pilots 
were design to generate innovation through introducing new market players, encourage 
professional discretion and expertise, and incentivise a focus on service quality (Stanley et al, 2013). 
In none of the studies covered by this review were the services or programmes directly provided or 
commissioned by central government, but rather by local authorities (local government). Yet in each 
case, PbR was introduced through national policy. Each approach therefore involved two levels of 
commissioning or implementation arrangements; a national level (between central government and 
the relevant local authorities), and a local level (where local authorities used PbR contracts to 
commissioning new services or for existing services. In each of the studies, outcome measures were 
specified at the national level, and local authorities were also able to choose additional outcome 
measures relevant to their local strategies, plans and contexts. And local authorities were able to 
utilise a range of different ways to deliver services to address these outcomes.  
Day et al (2016) identify three broad service delivery models for Troubled Families programmes, 
recognising that this categorisation “did not take account of the nuances of individual models” and 
that local decisions were influenced by a range of contextual issues of existing service delivery 
arrangements. Day et al (2016) suggest the three models they identify “ranged from those who 
created or expanded an existing team of workers (a dedicated team) to those who embedded their 
provision (either individuals or a team of people) within the workforce or were on a journey to 
transfer the whole workforce to adopt whole family working (the embedded approach)”. Along this 
continuum, Day et al suggest that most local authorities in their sample adopted a ‘hybrid’ model, 
where intervention was delivered “by a combination of a dedicated team and practitioners who 
were either embedded individually, or as part of a team, and those who were already working in 
existing services or agencies”. And while the national programme encouraged a ‘whole family’ 
approach to service delivery, the evaluation identified that “whole-family working was described and 
understood in different ways” and that “local practices varied quite considerable”. The report does 
not directly address whether these differences were examples of innovation or creativity; simply 
that there were a range of different approaches and service delivery models. 
The evaluation of PbR in Children’s Centres also identified a range of approaches, and speed at 
which models developed (Frontier Economics, 2014). Evidence from this evaluation suggests that 
local priorities, local resources, levels of local support for the trial and views on PbR more generally, 
and existing service patterns were all important influencing factors. The evaluators state that “there 
was little evidence that PbR had influenced the types of services delivered in Children’s Centres”. 
Overall, the report focuses on differences in the selection of outcome measures between local 
authorities, and does not provide detail on whether and to what extent the introduction of PbR 
changed how services were delivered.  
The evaluation of Supporting People PbR pilots addresses innovation more directly. Innovation was 
seen as a key objective for the introduction of PbR for housing related support services, particularly 
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to “encourage innovation amongst providers and/or to offer greater flexibility to construct services 
that enable clients to achieve outcomes” (DCLG, 2014). The study reports that “there were mixed 
views on Payment by Results as a means of fostering innovation and changes to working practices” 
and “while some providers have taken the introduction of Payment by Results terms as an 
opportunity to adjust their service offer, others have adopted a business as usual approach to 
delivery and had adapted only their monitoring processes to meet the contract reporting 
requirements” (DCLG, 2014). The report states that changes were directly prompted by PbR for 
some providers, and that one provider felt that PbR had reduced silo-working within its organisation 
(that is, the extent to which organisational structure affects service delivery). It also recognises that 
changing the behaviour of front line staff – to focus more on outcomes and to maintain records 
monitoring outcomes – was challenging for some providers. It is also reported that working 
arrangements between commissioners and providers were improved in a number of areas (DCLG, 
2016).  However, the report’s authors conclude that “examples of true innovation do however 
remain limited”. 
Evidence suggests that the Troubled Families programme “encouraged innovation, and the desire to 
trial new ways of working” and was a “catalyst for change” that focused some commissioners on 
better service integration and multi-agency working (Day et al, 2016). The evaluators also report that 
the programme “enabled local authorities to experiment with delivery models and types of 
provider” (Day et al, 2016). 
Outcomes 
Related to the issue of innovation is that of outcomes. PbR is expected to focus commissioners and 
providers on both measuring and improving outcomes for service users by providing financial 
incentives when outcomes are achieved. Webster (2016) is one of a number of authors who suggests 
that there is limited evidence from which conclusions can be made about the whether and to what 
extent PbR improves outcomes. 
In its survey of members and stakeholders involved in its work, Drugscope found that a majority of 
respondents “disagreed or strongly disagreed that Payment by Results would result in better 
services and improved outcomes” compared to a fifth who felt that it would improve services and 
outcomes. The sample size and sampling approach means that it is not possible to determine the 
representativeness of their findings. The other two survey-based studies (Kuznetsova, 2011, and 
Cundy, 2012) do not address the issue of PbR and outcomes. 
While improving outcomes was an explicit objective of the Children’s Centres PbR pilot, the 
evaluation team report that “the objective of improving outcomes for children was mentioned by 
very few” project leads and Directors of Children’s Services in survey responses (Frontier Economics, 
2014). The evaluators found that 66 per cent of the local measures used in the PbR pilots were 
output, rather than outcome, based. The report further states that a number of local authorities 
used both outcome and outputs measures, but that a smaller number only used outputs measures 
when specifying their contracts. The authors conclude that “one reason that there was a heavy 
emphasis on output rather than outcome-based local measures could be related to the problem of 
attribution in local measures” (Frontier Economics, 2014) and that there was a “lack of influence of 
national measures on the choice of local ones”. Stanley et al (2013) found that there was three of 
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the five Social Work Practices pilots covered by their research had a systematic approach to 
monitoring outcomes.  
The national evaluation of the Troubled Families programme provides a greater level of insight on 
the extent to which PbR influenced service providers and commissioners on measuring and focusing 
service delivery on achieving outcomes. The evaluators’ report suggests that PbR had “helped to give 
a focus and structure to the programme, and influenced local authorities to become more 
outcomes-focussed (sic)” (Day et al, 2016), as well as “aligning local Troubled Families Programmes 
with the national policy objectives, whilst ensuring that practitioners understood and responded to 
the diversity of families’ needs and circumstances..”. The evaluators also found that PbR was 
associated with improvements in the data collection, data quality, and information sharing at the 
local level (Day et al, 2016), a finding that is echoed in relation to PbR in Children’s Centres, where 
“local data collection and usage was reported to have improved in most areas during the trial 
period”, and also that there were improvements in information sharing (Frontier Economics, 2014).  
The evaluation of PbR in Children’s Centres suggests that improvements in data quality not only 
demonstrated what had been achieved, but also increased the “focus on services and activities that 
were most effective” (Frontier Economics, 2014). The authors conclude that “there was general 
recognition that the need for high quality and robust data created by PbR had led to widespread 
improvements in local data collection and usage”, though they also highlight that (1) this may reflect 
improvements in recording of data; and (2) more significantly, that “evidence from non-trial areas 
indicates that improvements in data collection and use are a more widespread trend unrelated to 
PbR” (Frontier Economics, 2014). 
Much of the extant literature raises the challenges associated with agreeing, defining, and 
measuring outcomes. These challenges include issues around timing; that is, understanding the 
point at which an outcome has been achieved and payment tricked (Kuznetsova, 2011)(DCLG, 
2014)(Day et al, 2016). Several studies also highlight the issue of attributing change to a specific 
programme or intervention, particularly when there may be multiple partners involved in delivering 
a multifaceted intervention (Day et al, 2016)(Frontier Economics, 2014)3.  
Only one of the studies included in this review measured the impact of the programme being 
evaluated, that of the national evaluation of the Troubled Families programme. This used two 
different methods to measure impact: a quasi-experimental approach using secondary outcome 
data from national databases (including matched propensity score comparators) and a survey of 
both treatment and matched comparison groups. Both of these approaches focused on the impact 
of the programme as a whole and not on PbR as a funding mechanism; the evaluation did not 
include any data collection from commissioners or providers about the effects of PbR, and such data 
would be unlikely to assess the impact of PbR because of the lack of a comparator group (all local 
authorities in England were involved in the programme). It is not possible, from the extant evidence 
covered by this review, to assess the impact of PbR as a funding mechanism, compared to other 
means of funding public services, or the extent to which PbR has an effect on outcomes achieved.  
                                                          
3 It is worth noting that a common feature of outcome-based PbR schemes in the UK is that they do not 
require attribution of achievement of outcomes for payment to be triggered. Current schemes simply measure 
whether there has been a change over a contract period and make payment on this basis. 
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Incentives 
A key assumption underpinning PbR is that financial incentives will affect the behaviour of 
commissioners and providers. These incentives could be both intended, in that the lead to achieve 
the desired objectives, and also perverse, in that the lead to outcomes not intended or desired. 
There are two perverse incentives that are addressed in the reviewed studies. The first, and one that 
is raised in the wider literature around PbR, is that financial incentives might encourage providers to 
engage in gaming behaviours - ‘cherry-picking’ service users who are easier to deal with and are 
therefore more likely to result in outcome-based payments, and ‘parking’ of service users who are 
unlikely to achieve outcome-based payments. The second perverse incentive is not addressed in the 
wider theoretical or critical literature, and relates to the disincentive to bid for or continue to deliver 
services involve PbR to smaller providers and particularly voluntary sector providers arising from the 
perceived high costs of establishing contracts and monitoring outcomes. 
Two of the evaluation reports identify that gaming behaviour was perceived as an inherent risk to 
PbR. DCLG (2014) state that Supporting People commissioners “have been conscious that a move to 
Payment by Results terms could incentivise providers to prioritise clients who show greatest 
potential for progression rather than those in greatest need of support”. Similarly, the Children’s 
Centre PbR pilot report states that “there were a significant number of speculative concerns about 
perverse incentives and unintended consequences” (Frontier Economics, 2014). In both cases, 
evaluators found little evidence of such gaming behaviour actually happening. DCLG (2014) identify 
that a series of arrangements were put in place to reduce the risk of cherry-picking or parking 
behaviours, and report that “on the whole, unintended consequences of Payment by Results appear 
to be minimal, and the steps (taken)….have helped minimise the potential financial disincentives for 
providers to work with more challenging clients”. Frontier Economics (2014) also found that “very 
few actual adverse effects were observed”, and also highlight the awareness of risk of gaming and 
arrangements to minimise the likelihood of gaming may have effected levels of observed gaming 
behaviours. 
Cundy (2012), DCLG (2014), Compact Voice (2016), and Ward et al (2010) identify a second perverse 
incentive that relates to the costs of bidding and managing PbR contracts, and how these discourage 
or prevent smaller and/or local third sector organisations from bidding for PbR related work. Jessica 
Cundy, in her research for Barnardo’s on the experiences of third sector organisations in the 
commissioning of family services, states that the upfront costs of bidding are a major barrier to third 
sector organisations presented by PbR (Cundy, 2012). Similarly, Compact Voice (2016) report that 
“PbR contracts often require a significant amount of upfront capital and can involve a degree of risk 
that precludes the involvement of many smaller voluntary organisations, even if they are the most 
appropriate provider of the service”. Part of the risk associated with PbR contracts is that of deferred 
payment; that a proportion of funding is provided after work has been completed, and only when 
outcomes have been achieved. Cundy (2016) quotes a survey response by one third sector 
organisation to illustrate this, stating “we couldn’t survive on a PbR contract because we simply 
couldn’t afford to pay our rent and our salaries. We don’t have the money that’s required in reserve 
for 6 months or a year”. Commissioner-side costs of implementing PbR are also identified as being 
high (for example, Frontier Economics (2014) and Day et al (2016) both raise this), but no evidence is 
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provided on whether these high costs might create barriers to, or disincentivise commissioners from, 
the use of PbR. 
One of the core assumptions underpinning the design of Payment by Results is that incentives 
matter, that “the architects……had envisaged that incentives would play a role” (Le Grand, 2007, as 
cited in Stanley et al, 2013). In each of the three evaluations included in this review, a key design of 
PbR was its two-tier nature; that is, PbR was used both to incentivise local authorities in their 
commissioning of services, and also to allow local authorities to use PbR in their contracts with 
service providers. In some cases, local authorities were both commissioners and providers. For 
example, there were 26 areas in the trial of PbR in Children’s Centres, “of which 14 areas directly 
managed all or most of the centres, while 12 areas commissioned all or most of their centres” 
(Frontier Economics, 2014). Here, the evaluators suggest that there were implementation 
differences between those areas that directly managed or commissioned Children’s Centre, with 
commissioning areas being “more innovative and quicker to adopt change” than those directly 
managed areas (Frontier Economics, 2014). It is unclear from this research whether the financial 
rewards may have affected the behaviour of these areas. The evaluation report goes on to suggest 
that the “the rewards payments were too small” and that “the payment mechanism element of the 
national PbR had very little impact on local thinking and behaviour” (Frontier Economics, 2014). The 
report goes on to suggest that more substantive rewards may have provided a greater level of 
incentive.` 
 
Discussion  
There has and continues to be much interest in the use of outcome-based performance and 
payment arrangements in the commissioning of public services, of which Payment by Results is one 
significant example. In theory, by providing a financial reward to providers that is triggered by the 
delivery of outcomes, coupled with freedoms to decide how services and interventions might be 
designed and delivered, providers will be incentivised to focus on service users, on their outcomes, 
and on delivering services that are evidenced as working. Increasingly, PbR is being used in relation 
to social care sector, which has only recently started to develop agreement around, and measures 
of, outcomes (Kuznetsova, 2011).  
Despite a number of pilots and trials of PbR, and numerous examples of PbR being used to 
commission services, there is dearth of evidence around their impact and their effectiveness in 
relation to social care services. The evidence that does exist is largely in grey literature, and is 
typically evaluation reports commissioned by the government department responsible for piloting a 
PbR scheme for a programme, intervention or group of services. In two cases, the evaluations are 
examining how PbR operated (DCLG, 2014)(Frontier Economics, 2014); both were qualitative 
evaluations, and do not focus on the impact of PbR or compare it to other commissioning 
approaches. The third evaluation covered in this review, that of the Troubled Families programme, 
did include a measure of impact. However, that evaluation focused on the impact of the programme 
as a whole in terms of its policy objectives (reducing truancy, reducing engagement in criminal and 
anti-social behaviour, for example) and not the impact of PbR as a mechanism for funding social care 
services. 
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Overall,  the evidence on whether PbR does change the behaviour of commissioners and providers 
as intended – on whether it incentivises a focus on outcomes, encourages innovation in how services 
are delivered to achieve those outcomes, or leads to ‘gaming behaviours’ – is somewhat mixed. 
There is evidence to suggest that PbR is associated with a greater focus on outcomes, or at least 
more interest in collecting data around outcomes. But there is also evidence to suggest that the 
concept of outcomes is still a difficult one in terms of agreeing what outcomes are expected from 
social care intervention, over what time period, how outcomes might be measured, and whether 
and how outcomes might be attributed to a specific programme, intervention or service.  
This may, of course, reflect the types of programmes, interventions and services covered by the 
empirical research included in this review. These are each complex programmes, that typically 
involve multiple agencies delivering a range interventions, and intended to achieve a wide range of 
outcomes. It is therefore worth asking whether the programmes covered here are really suitable for 
piloting PbR mechanisms when PbR itself is a relatively new contracting arrangement. Of course, 
arguably most social care services include some level of complexity; complexity in terms of the 
needs of the service user, the mechanism by which the intervention is intended to address those 
needs, and when and what outcomes are achieved through those mechanisms. But it does seem 
that policy makers have selected difficult cases in which to explore, examine, and test PbR (and 
outcome-based commissioning more generally). 
 
Strengths and limitations of this study 
This is the first Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of the extant literature on the use of outcome-
based Payment by Results for commissioning of social care in the United Kingdom. A key strength of 
the REA process is that it provides a comprehensive and systematic search of the available evidence, 
an explicit selection process and clear statement of which studies are included and which are 
excluded, and a rigorous method for synthesising the findings of those studies that meet the 
inclusion criteria. 
There are several limitations inherent in the method used in this study to undertake the REA. First, 
only one researcher has been involved in the search, review, assessment against inclusion criteria, 
and synthesis of findings from studies that met the criteria. This study has been an unfunded piece 
of research, and it was not possible to recruit suitable other researchers to be involved in the 
process. Typically, more than one researcher is involved in each of the stages of the review to reduce 
any potential for selection bias.  
Secondly, a quantitative synthesis was not possible because of the lack of relevant studies, and 
because of issues of heterogeneity of study designs, contexts, and outcomes in the few studies that 
do focus on measuring and attributing impact. Indeed, while the focus of the study was on the use of 
outcome-based PbR in social care, it is clear from table 1 overleaf that this covers a wide variety of 
interventions and services, and in most cases only a single study on a specific type of social care 
intervention has been published. The study reported here therefore focused on questions of how 
PbR is being used, why it is being used and what objectives its use was intended to achieve, as well 
as the challenges and barriers faced by commissioners and others when using outcome-based PbR in 
social care. Because of this focus, the study utilises a narrative synthesis approach and is 
fundamentally a qualitative review of the extant literature.  
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Indeed, the term ‘social care’ covers a broad range of services, interventions and programmes, and is 
very challenging to define. In undertaking this review, I have assumed a broad definition of social 
care. The advantage of such an approach is that I have been able to examine the use of PbR in a 
number of different contexts, but it does mean that some studies have been included that include 
elements that may not be considered to be social care in the strictest sense. 
Forthly, I have not undertaken any assessment of the robustness of the methods utilised, or the risk 
of bias associated with the method used, in any of the studies included in this review. The strength 
of the conclusions draw is limited by the quality of the individual studies covered. 
 
Conclusions 
This review adds to the evidence based around the use of Payment by Results, and specifically its use 
in social care. The review found that there was a limited evidence based around the use of PbR in 
social care. There were three types of empirical evidence identified in this review. These include, 
firstly, the piloting or testing of PbR for existing services (three studies); secondly, the use of PbR as 
part of a new programme (one study); and thirdly, research with commissioners, providers, and 
practitioners around commissioning experiences and expectations. A number of the studies covered 
by this review identified other, local PbR schemes, covering a wide range of social care interventions 
and services. These local schemes are entirely absent from the empirical literature. More research is 
therefore needed around the use of PbR, how it works, whether and where it is appropriate in social 
care services, and whether it is effective. 
 
 
  
A rapid evidence review of the use of Payment by Results in social care – paper for ICPP 2017 
Author: Dr Chris O’Leary, Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, Manchester Metropolitan University 
Email:  c.oleary@mmu.ac.uk  
 
DRAFT – NOT TO BE CITED WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 
P a g e  | 20 
 
References 
Appleby, J, Harrison, T, Hawkins, L and Dixon, A (2012) Payment by Results. How can payment 
systems help to deliver better care. London; King’s Fund 
Battye, F (2015) Payment by Results in the UK: progress to date and future directions for evaluation, 
Evaluation, 21(2), pp189-203 
Cabinet Office (2011) Modernising commissioning: increasing the role of charities, social enterprises, 
mutual and cooperatives in public service delivery. London; Cabinet Office 
Compact Voice (2016) Annual survey of Compacts. Accessed online on 1st May 2017 at 
http://www.compactvoice.org.uk/sites/default/files/imgupload/compact_voice_annual_survey_201
5_final.pdf  
Cundy, J (2016) Commissioning for better outcomes: understanding local authority and voluntary 
sector experiences of family services commissioning in England. London; Barnado’s. 
Day et al (2016) National evaluation of the Trouble Families programme - final synthesis report. 
London; Department for Communities and Local Government 
DCLG (2014) Supporting People Payment by Results pilots. Final evaluation. London; Department of 
Communities and Local Government 
Dixon-Woods, M, Agarwal, S, Jones, D, Young B and Sutton A (2005) Synthesizing qualitative and 
quantitative evidence: a review of possible methods. Journal of Health Service Research and Policy, 
10(1), pp45-53 
Fox, C (2016) Is ‘Pay for Success’ an efficient way to unlock new capital investment and advance 
social goods? Working paper. 
Fox, C, Albertson, K, O’Leary, C, Bailey, G, Baines, S and Ozan, J (2017) Are Payment by Results and 
social impact bonds efficient ways to advance social goods? Working paper. 
Frontier Economics and the Colebrooke Centre (2014) Payment by Results in Children's Centres 
evaluation. London; Department of Education 
Hood, C (1991) A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69(1), pp3-19 
Kuznetsova, D (2011) Commissioning care in the 21st century: improving outcomes for people with 
learning disabilities. London; New Local Government Network 
Lee, S, Morley, M, Taylor, R, Kielhofner, G, Garnham, M, Heasman, D and Forsyth, K (2010) The 
development of care pathways and packages in mental health based on the Model of Human 
Occupational Screening Tool. British Journal of Occupational Therapy, 74(6), pp284-294 
Lowe, T (2013) New development: The paradox of outcomes-the more we measure, the less we 
understand, Public Money and Management, 33(3), pp213-216 
Lowe, T and Wilson, R (2015) Playing the game of outcome-based performance management. Is 
gamesmanship inevitable? Evidence from theory and practice, Social Policy and Administration, doi: 
10.1111/spol.12205. 
A rapid evidence review of the use of Payment by Results in social care – paper for ICPP 2017 
Author: Dr Chris O’Leary, Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, Manchester Metropolitan University 
Email:  c.oleary@mmu.ac.uk  
 
DRAFT – NOT TO BE CITED WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 
P a g e  | 21 
 
National Audit Office (2015) Outcome-based payment schemes: government’s use of Payment by 
Results. London; National Audit Office 
Snilstveit, B, Oliver, S and Vojtkova, M (2012) Narrative approaches to systematic review and 
synthesis of evidence for international policy and practice. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 
4(3), pp409-429 
Stanley, N, Austerberry, H, Bilson, A, Farrelly, N, Hussein, S, Larkins, C, Manthorpe, J and Ridley, J 
(2013) Turning away from the public sector in children’s out-of-home care: an English experiment, 
Children and Youth Services Review, 35, pp33-39 
Tan, S, Fraser. A, Goiacomantonio, C, Kruithof, K, Sim, M, Legarde, M, Disley, Rubin, J and Mays, N 
(2015) An evaluation of social impact bonds in health and social care. London; Policy Innovation 
Research Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
Visram, S, Cheetham, M, Riby, D, Crossley, S and Lake, A (2016) Consum,ption of energy drinks by 
children and young people: a rapid review examining evidence of physical effects and consumer 
attitudes. BMJ Open 
Ward, E, Sample, E, and Roberts, M (2010) Testing the waters. Druglink, 25(6), pp.11-14 
Webster, R (2016) Payment by Results: lessons from the literature. Russell Webster. Accessed online 
on 1st March 2017 at http://www.russellwebster.com/payment-by-results-lessons-from-the-
literature/  
Wright, J, Dempster, P, Keen, J, Allen, P and Hutchings, A (2014) How should we evaluate the 
impacts of policy? The case of Payment by Results and the 18 week patient pathway in English 
hospitals. Policy Studies, 35(1), pp59-78 
 
